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Abstract
This paper presents empirical evidence that “tax morale” - taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes - constitutes a new determinant of happiness, even after controlling for several demographic
and socioeconomic factors. Using data on Italian households for 2004, we assess the strength of
tax morale by relying on single items as well as composite multi-item indices. Our main result
that ﬁscal honesty generates a higher hedonic payoﬀ than cheating is in line with Harbaugh et al.
(2007)’s neuroeconomic ﬁnding. Further, it sheds light on the well-known “puzzle of compliance”,
that is the fact that many individuals pay taxes even when expected penalty and audit probability
are extremely low: tax compliance is less puzzling once we show that not only it is materially costly,
but also provides sizeable non-pecuniary beneﬁts that make it rewarding in itself.
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It is hardly deniable that investigating morality is important for economics. As Harsanyi (1980)
points out, a relevant branch of economic theory such as welfare economics can be seen as an
endeavor to understand how to apply certain moral principles (i.e. Pareto-optimality, distributive
justice and individual freedom) to economic activities. As to political economy, Tabellini (2008)
observes that morality - viewed as conceptions of what is right or wrong, and of how one ought
to behave in speciﬁc circumstances - is bound to exert a strong inﬂuence on voters’ demands and
expectations, on citizens’ participation in group activities, on the extent of moral hazard inside
public organizations and on the willingness of individuals to provide public goods. His empirical
analysis indicates that values consistent with generalized morality are widespread in societies with
well-functioning institutions and instrumental variable estimation suggests a causal eﬀect from
values to institutional outcomes. However, despite the relevance of personal values and attitudes
towards public issues, economists so far have mainly neglected their potential impact on individual
happiness (or subjective well-being)1.
Our paper extends this area of research by making a ﬁrst attempt to study a new potential
determinant of self-reported happiness within developed economies: people’s ﬁscal morality. Our
focus is on an economically relevant form of morality such as individuals’ moral attitude towards
taxation - the so called tax morale. To our knowledge, the impact of the extent and variety of
tax morale on happiness has never been empirically tested, so far. We do this by addressing the
following questions: do people diﬀer in their moral attitude towards taxation? What are the main
determinants of their tax morale? Do public-spirited individuals experience diﬀerent happiness
levels, compared to less morally concerned ones? As we will show in the next sections, the dataset
we use allows us to operationalize diﬀerent moral attitudes towards taxation, identify the main
variables aﬀecting citizens’ moral attitudes and subsequently assess their happiness levels. Our
main ﬁnding that individuals with higher levels of tax morale are also signiﬁcantly happier is in
line with the well-known neuroeconomic experiment on taxation run by Harbaugh et al. (2007),
where even mandatory, tax-like transfers to a charity elicit neural activity in areas related to reward
processing.
This paper lies at the crossroads of two lines of research. One is the economics of happiness
literature. Fiscal morality is to be added to a growing list of non-pecuniary determinants of hap-
piness such as political participation (Frey and Stutzer, 2000), volunteering (Thoits and Hewitt,
2001), marriage (Stutzer and Frey, 2006), relational goods (Bruni and Stanca, 2008) and religiosity
1Even though we are aware that the two notions are not conceptually identical, we use the terms ‘happiness’ and
‘subjective well-being’ interchangeably.
1(Clark and Lelkes, 2009). Moreover, a positive and strong correlation between happiness and tax
morale allows us to gain further insights on the so called “hedonistic paradox”, stating that homo
economicus, who seeks happiness for himself, will not ﬁnd it, while the person who helps others
will.
The second line of research is the literature on tax compliance and in particular the studies
focusing on the relationship between tax morale and tax compliance (see, among others, Andreoni
et al., 1998). In the last years, several empirical studies have shown that taxpayers are more honest
than classic deterrence models inspired by the economics of crime approach would predict (see, e.g.,
Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). But why are many people willing to pay taxes even when penalties
and audit probability are extremely low? Recent work in the area suggests that individuals’ tax
morale may provide the “missing link” that makes it possible to bridge the gap between theory
and data and ﬁnally contribute to solve the so called “puzzle of compliance”. The rationale behind
the relationship between tax morale and tax compliance is that insofar as citizens are driven by a
positive moral attitude towards taxation (i.e. a high degree of tax morale), the level of compliance
– other things being equal – will turn out to be higher.
However, even though this argument is intuitively appealing, it is important to note that,
on empirical grounds, the current emphasis on tax morale and its supposed relevance for the
economics of tax compliance is misplaced unless a positive correlation between tax morale and
tax compliance can be established. In his survey, Halla (2010a) observes that in the last years,
several studies, by means of both direct and indirect approaches, document a positive relationships
between tax morale and tax compliance. The direct approach mainly relies on evidence from
laboratory experiments which allow researchers to obtain from a single sample not only behavioral
data on tax compliance (from the experiment itself) but also self-reported data on tax morale (from
post-experiment questionnaires) as, for instance, in Torgler et al. (2007). A ﬁrst limitation of this
approach is that it needs to be carefully checked whether the answers in the questionnaire are
independent from the behavior in the experiment. A second drawback has to do with the artiﬁcial
nature of the environment in which the data are generated: even though such experiments are
typically run by using non-neutral, tax language to make the setting more realistic, it is not possible
to rule out that subjects would behave diﬀerently when dealing with real tax authorities, rather
than with experimenters. Hence, the importance of integrating data from laboratory experiments
with evidence from other environments. In an artefactual ﬁeld experiment, Cummings et al. (2009)
were able to provide further support for the hypothesis that tax morale exerts a positive impact
on tax compliance.
A diﬀerent (indirect) approach, by working at a more aggregate level, looks at tax evasion
estimates for a large set of countries and years and match them with country-averages of tax
2morale from international surveys. A series of recent papers report a negative correlation between
average levels of tax morale and the size of the shadow economy in Latin America, the U.S. and
Europe, and in several transition countries (see the survey by Halla, 2010a). In the last years some
papers based on this indirect approach took a step further and directly dealt with the causality
issue, addressing then the identiﬁcation problem and suggesting an instrumental variable approach
to disentangle a causal eﬀect (Torgler and Schneider, 2009; Halla, 2010b). They ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of tax morale on the size of the shadow economy. To sum up, despite the
fact that each approach has strengths and weaknesses, the methodologies described above send a
convergent message about the connection under study.
Even though a signiﬁcant relationship between tax morale and tax compliance can be estab-
lished, so far the notion of tax morale has often been treated as a black box, “without discussing
or even considering how it might arise or how it might be maintained. It is usually perceived as
being part of the meta-preferences of taxpayers and used as the residuum in the analysis capturing
unknown inﬂuences to tax evasion. The more interesting question then is which factors shape the
emergence and maintenance of tax morale” (Feld and Frey, 2002). Our main result - virtuous
taxpayers reporting higher happiness levels than less virtuous ones - helps shedding light on the
concept of tax morale and contributes to our understanding of why the levels of compliance are gen-
erally higher than the standard theory predicts. Insofar as we concentrate on the key relationship
between tax compliance and tax morale and morally concerned people experience a high degree
of subjective well-being, a relatively high level of compliance turns out to be far less paradoxical
than it seems to be at ﬁrst glance: it can be plausibly argued that an important reason why people
comply with their ﬁscal duties is that they perceive the act of paying taxes as rewarding in itself.
Using a dataset on Italian taxpayers’ opinions on civicness and taxation, we carry out an
empirical analysis on tax morale and its relationship with happiness that sheds light on a crucial
issue within a distinct and relevant area of research such as the economics of tax compliance. As
anticipated above, our main ﬁnding is that virtuous taxpayers are signiﬁcantly happier than less
virtuous ones, even if a long list demographic and socioeconomic factors is controlled for, and
a number of robustness checks are undertaken. Instrumental variable estimation suggests that
this correlation reﬂects an independent causal eﬀect of tax morale on happiness. We reach this
conclusion with regard to both tax morale indices and single aspects of tax morale.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline several varieties
of tax morale and illustrate our data analysis and regression results on its determinants. Section
3 explores the relationship between happiness and tax morale, with regard to both ﬁscal morality
indices and single items. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of our major ﬁnding.
32. Tax morale
Diﬀerent aspects of tax morale can be sorted through thanks to the 2004 wave of the Survey
of Italian Households’ Income and Wealth (SHIW) run by the Bank of Italy. The dataset includes
approximately 8,000 households for a total of 20,581 individuals2. Besides the available data on
social, demographic and economic characteristics, we use information from the section on “Opinions
on public spirit and taxation”, which is unique to the 2004 wave. Since only household heads born
in odd years are interviewed in this section, our dataset consists of 3,795 observations. Descriptive
statistics on these variables as well as on the demographics can be found in Table 1. As for the
demographic proﬁle of the sample, about 60% are males, overall only 8.6% of household heads
have been awarded a college degree (“Laurea”) and an additional 30% hold a high school diploma.
Households with 2 to 4 components amount to almost 70% of the sample, in half of the households
there is only one income earner and in an additional 40% of the households we observe two income
earners. Only 11.5% of household heads are self-employed and slightly less than 3% are unemployed.
Our measure of income is given by net disposable income. We also use data on ﬁnancial wealth
and real assets holdings. Financial wealth is deﬁned as the sum of cash holdings, bank deposits
(including certiﬁcates of deposit, deposit books and saving certiﬁcates), government securities,
mutual funds holdings, shares of stocks, life insurance premia and pension funds. Real assets are
obtained as the sum of real estate, precious objects and business equity minus ﬁnancial liabilities.
Our focus is on some questions in the section on public spirit and taxation, which aim at
identifying the respondent’s opinions both on diﬀerent aspects of the taxation principles and on
the Italian tax system, including tax evasion and tax amnesties. The interviewed are asked to
what extent they agree with each statement (in a list) according to the scale: not at all, very
little, so-so, quite a lot, very much. Given that each question is informative on diﬀerent aspects
of the stance on ﬁscal morality and that it may be viewed as an inherently multifaceted notion,
diﬀerently from major existing studies where the level of ﬁscal morality is assessed by considering
a single statement only (see, e.g., Frey and Torgler, 2007; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Verme, 2009),
we have the opportunity to investigate multiple dimensions of respondents’ tax morale. Further,
we shall also build aggregate tax morale indices averaging the responses to the single items. Tax
morale indices should be less sensitive to measurement errors and outliers in the single response
and, therefore, they provide a more thorough view of the individual’s intrinsic attitude towards
taxation.
2The SHIW dataset is described in detail in the Supplements to the Statistical Bulletin issued by the Bank of
Italy and available at http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait/boll stat/en shiw04.pdf.
42.1. Varieties of tax morale
Tax morale comes in various forms. As we shall see, the questionnaire allows us to keep its
multifaceted nature into account.
The ﬁrst statement we focus on is
Kantian: Paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship.
which clearly identiﬁes a strong commitment to paying taxes: regardless of whether taxes are
perceived as too high, of how the Government spends the money raised through taxes, of whether
the ﬁscal system is (perceived as) fair and so on, those who answered “very much” reveal that for
them paying taxes is a fundamental moral duty. In terms of moral philosophy, we see this view
as naturally connected with the classic notion of Kant’s categorical moral imperative “Act only
on the maxim that you would at the same time will to be a universal law”. The Kantian view
is an example of the “theories of unconditional commitment” (Sugden, 1984) according to which
individuals are supposed to pursue their self-interest subject to moral constraints.
The statement:
Community: Not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit as it
harms the whole community.
explores a related aspect of tax morale where a direct connection with the consequences of cheating
on taxes on the community where the individual lives is postulated. Next, we consider
Redistributive: It is right to pay taxes because it helps the weak.
which attempts to recover the respondents’ attitude towards justice and the degree of accordance
with the redistributive role that the State plays through taxation. An important reason to pay
taxes is that the tax revenue might be used to improve the living conditions of the poor and the
weak. It is natural to relate this intrinsic motivation to the notion of inequity aversion. Alesina
et al. (2004) observe that, in modern democracies, where governments redistribute to a signiﬁcant
extent, it is very likely that not only the poor but even the net losers from redistributive schemes
support them insofar as poverty and inequality are perceived as socially harmful. A redistributive
motive may emerge as a mix of genuinely unselﬁsh concerns and self-interest, to the extent that
inequality breeds crime and threats to property rights.
The fourth statement captures the dimension of what we label as vertical equity, as it deals
with the relationship between Government and taxpayers:
5Vertical: People try to avoid paying taxes because they know the Government spends
the money badly.
Leviathan’s behavior may turn out to be unsatisfactory and some citizens may be sensitive to this,
in deﬁning their moral attitude towards taxation. Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and Smith (1992)
set up models in which a taxpayer will feel ‘cheated’ if she believes that her money is not well spent,
and may reciprocate by refusing to pay her full tax liability. Next, we have
Fairness: It is right not to pay taxes if you think they are unfair.
According to this statement paying taxes crucially depends on the perceived fairness of the tax
system. An unfair tax system could lead people to ‘rationalize’ cheating (Andreoni et al., 1998).
The Vertical and Fairness motives coincide with the two dimensions according to which, in Spicer
and Lundstedt (1976)’s analysis, a taxpayer could judge the fairness of the terms of trade oﬀered
to him by the state: ﬁrst, he may perceive his terms of trade with Government as unfair because
the quantity and/or quality of goods received are considered inadequate with respect to his tax
payment; second, he may perceive the distribution of the tax burden across taxpayers as unfair,
either because the tax structure is considered unfair or because the other taxpayers cheat.
Further insights on respondents’ tax morale can be gained by looking at the opinions on tax
evasion and tax amnesties, collected in
Tax evasion: Generally speaking, among the problems facing the Government, that of
tax evasion is: Very serious, Serious, The same as any other, Marginal, Non-existent.
Tax amnesty: What is your opinion of the practice of granting amnesties? (1)
Amnesties are a good system and should be granted as often as possible to recover
some of the lost revenue; (2) Amnesties are a good system, but should be used spar-
ingly so as not to encourage tax evaders; (3) Amnesties are an unfair but necessary
method of balancing the national accounts; (4) Amnesties are a very unfair system
because they discourage honest citizens.
As we know, it is often the case that statutory tax rules are being violated to a large extent by tax
evasion: this generates an unjust disparity in the payments by honest and dishonest citizens, so that
citizens may be sensitive to this, in their decision-making process over compliance. Views on tax
amnesties provide further evidence on respondents’ tax morale. Given that Italy has experienced
quite a long list of tax amnesties, it is interesting to investigate people’s perception about this
practice.
6The percentage of respondents for each category of the selected questions on tax morale is
tabulated in Table 2-4. As a ﬁrst step in the descriptive analysis, we examine the correlations among
the answers to these statements. The ordinal nature of the opinions on ﬁscal morality suggests the
use of polychoric correlations which are computed under the assumption that there exists a latent
continuum for the ordinal responses (i.e., the 5-point scale) and that the observed response can
be interpreted as a respondent’s view above a given number of latent threshold points (deﬁned on
the latent continuous unobservable variable). Table 5 reports the polychoric correlations among
the seven items. Apart from the moderate correlation between the Kantian and the Community
questions (0.59), which may indicate that they point to a common aspect of tax morale, correlations
are in general weak (less than 0.4) or very weak (less than 0.2) and, in general, there is no clear
pattern of correlation among these variables. Then, it seems that the questionnaire is indeed able
to identify diﬀerent aspects of ﬁscal morality and that an analysis by item is meaningful.
More descriptive statistics are provided in Table 6, where we condition on diﬀerent characteris-
tics of the sample. The preliminary analysis based on descriptive statistics about these statements
makes clear that four variables play a key role in aﬀecting people’s moral attitude towards taxation,
namely (1) macro-regional area of residence, (2) occupational status, (3) gender and (4) town size.
More speciﬁcally, with regard to a macro-regional area eﬀect, it turns out that, in general, South-
erners are less morally concerned towards taxation than citizens living in the rest of the country,
as they are driven by a lower degree of Kantian, Community-oriented and Redistributive morality
and more prone to justify cheating depending on both the perceived fairness of the tax system and
the way the Government uses the money raised. A possible explanation for these macro-regional
diﬀerences in terms of tax morale might be related to the well-known diﬀerences in the stock of
social capital between South and rest of Italy. A clear North-South duality, with regard to the
level of social capital in Italy, emerges in several studies (Putnam, 1993), in line with Banﬁeld
(1925)’s well-known argument that the backwardness of Southern Italy has to do with a lack of
trust outside the family circle (a phenomenon that he termed “amoral familism”). Moreover, it
is very likely that a direct experience of misuse of tax revenues in Southern Italy plays a role in
accounting for the lower level of Vertical morality in this area. Further, the descriptive evidence
on tax evasion and tax amnesties indicate that Southerners are less prone to view tax evasion as
a “very serious/serious” problem, compared to respondents from other parts of the country. As
to occupational status, self-employed display a stronger Vertical morality compared to employed
people, being more sensitive to whether the Government spends the money raised badly or not.
This result is consistent with Frey and Torgler (2007)’s ﬁnding, showing that self-employed exhibit
lower tax morale. With respect to gender, females turn out to be less morally concerned than
males, in the sense of a lower degree of Kantian morality, and driven by a weaker redistributive
7motive towards taxation3.
Tax morale indices
On the basis of the economic and philosophical interpretation of these questions and the pre-
liminary empirical evidence, we consider two multi-item, aggregate indices of ﬁscal morality. A
ﬁrst natural aggregation (TM1) is obtained by averaging the categorical response to all questions,
which are recorded on a 1-5 scale4. The second index (TM2) is obtained from the aggregation of
ﬁve items (Kantian, Community, Redistributive, Tax evasion and Tax amnesty) thereby excluding
the Vertical and Fairness motives. This latter choice can be supported on empirical and theoretical
grounds. Firstly, even though the moderate/weak polychoric correlations among the items do not
provide a clear indication on how to proceed in the aggregation, Vertical displays a low correlation
with all questions but Fairness (and viceversa). This would suggest to consider an aggregation
which excludes these two items from a tax morale index, as in TM2. Secondly, in the existing liter-
ature, tax morale is usually assessed by considering a single simple question asking (on a 1-10 scale
as in the World Value Survey) whether cheating on taxes is never justiﬁable (score 1) or always
justiﬁable (score 10). This statement captures a clear unconditional moral commitment towards
paying taxes. Analogously, both our ﬁrst three items (Kantian, Community and Redistributive)
and the tax evasion and amnesty questions reﬂect an unconditional moral attitude towards taxation
based on a principle requiring each agent to make whatever contribution he would wish others to
make - irrespective of whether the others actually make this contribution. By contrast, the Vertical
and Fairness questions are driven by a form of conditional morality, that is by a genuine but less
morally demanding individual attitude towards taxation. A similar distinction between uncondi-
tional and conditional cooperators can be found in Knack and Keefer (1997)’s paper on trust and
its relationship with economic growth. In general, as these composite indices are obtained from
the aggregation of answers to the diﬀerent questions, they may provide more representative, pre-
cise and robust descriptions of the individual standing towards ﬁscal issues, compared to responses
from single items. Figures 1-2 report the empirical distribution of the two tax morale indices and
summary statistics can be found at the top of Table 1.
3This evidence contrasts with Cadsby et al. (2006) who, in their experimental work on tax compliance, found that
that males exhibit less compliance than females, and with Frey and Torgler (2007)’s ﬁnding based on EVS data that
women exhibit higher tax morale than men.
4Answering “Very much” (resp., “Not at all” ) to the questions capturing Kantian, Community and Redistributive
questions yields 5 (resp., 1), whereas answering “Not at all” (resp., “Very much” ) to the questions capturing Vertical
and Fairness yields 5 (resp., 0) points. Answering “Very serious” (resp., “Non-existent” ) to the question related to
Tax evasion yields 5 (resp., 1) points. Finally, answering “Very unfair” (resp., “Good and often”) to the question
related to Tax amnesty yields 5 (resp., 1) points.
8Further, these indices are useful to shed light on the important issue mentioned in the Intro-
duction of whether self-reported tax morale can be safely used as an indicator of actual tax morale.
Following the so-called indirect approach, by which the size of the shadow economy (or tax evasion)
is taken as an indicator of actual tax morale, we compute the average of the broader tax morale
index TM1 at the NUTS 2 regional level and match it with the corresponding estimates (at NUTS2
regional level) of the shadow economy from Herwartzy et al. (2010, Table 8). The strong negative
correlation between the size of the shadow economy and the tax morale index is evident from Figure
3 (the slope coeﬃcient is -1.94 and t-ratio based on robust standard errors is equal to -6.61). We
interpret this result, which is in line with evidence from other countries (Halla, 2010b), as a strong
support of the use of self-reported tax morale as a reliable indicator of actual tax morale.
2.2. Determinants of tax morale: regression results
In order to explore the black box of tax morale, we undertake an investigation of its determi-
nants. Given the ordinal nature of the answers to these questions, the regression analysis is carried
out using an ordered probit model. Opinions about taxation can be viewed as a latent continuous
variable, say y∗
i , modeled as a linear regression of some measurable factors, say xi, plus an error
term, ui to account for unobserved factors. Accounting for the intensity of the agreement with
the given statement, the ordinal response variable yi takes integer values j = 0,...,J according to
whether  j−1 < y∗
i ≤  j, where  0 <  1 < ··· <  J−1 (with  −1 = −∞ and  J = +∞). In our
data, the yi’s are available on the scale: not at all, very little, so-so, quite a lot, very much. Under
the assumption of a Gaussian error term, the probability of observing a particular response is given
by
Prob(yi = 0|x) = Φ( 0 − x′
iβ)
Prob(yi = j|x) = Φ( j − x′
iβ) − Φ( j−1 − x′
iβ)
Prob(yi = J|x) = 1 − Φ( J−1 − x′
iβ)
where Φ(·) is the distribution function of the Standard Normal random variable. Estimation results
are reported in Table 8 where the reference group is given by single males blue collar workers, living
in Northern Italy in a city with less than 40.000 inhabitants. We recall that only the direction of
the change in the probability of choosing the farthest categories can be recovered from the sign of
the coeﬃcient estimates. Regression results are reported in Table 7 for the tax morale scores and
in Table 8 for the individual components of the indices.
The set of explanatory variables includes the usual demographic characteristics such as age,
gender, marital status, education, employment status, household size and composition, town size
as well as regional macro-area dummies. We use the log of net disposable income, say y, and,
9following Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), we also work with the log of a reference income level, say yR,
computed as the average income in a group composed by all household heads in the same age
bracket, deﬁned using a moving window of ±5 years centered at the age of the individual, with
the same educational qualiﬁcation and living in the same macro-region (North, Center, South). If
individuals make comparisons within their own reference group, the diﬀerence between household’s
own income and reference income becomes relevant and the larger this diﬀerence the stronger may
be the eﬀect on respondents’ views on the tax system. In addition, we use information on two
dimensions of social behavior (categorized as two dummy variables): interest in politics and active
participation in associations involved in social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural,
sports or recreational, professional or voluntary activity. In fact, it can be argued that interest in
politics and active participation in associations are clear signals of the respondent’s consciousness
of the relevant issues for the society as a whole and of her willingness to contribute to the common
good of the society, respectively.
Several general remarks apply to our regression results. First, we ﬁnd that education is an
important determinant of tax morale. It seems that schooling provides an important channel
through which ethical principles can be disseminated in the community and the magnitude of
this eﬀect increases with the educational level attained. For instance, considering the “Kantian”
statement, probably the most demanding one from an ethical viewpoint, we can clearly reject the
null hypothesis of no eﬀect of education (F test equal to 40.95) and of no diﬀerential eﬀect of
higher educational attainments (F test equal to 32.37). We can also reject the null hypothesis
of no diﬀerential eﬀect of junior high school over primary school (t-test equal to 2.80) and of no
diﬀerential eﬀect of high school degree over junior high school (t-test equal to 4.07), whereas no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be found between high school and college degree. This result suggests
that legislation enforcing compulsory schooling up to the high school level may be eﬀective not only
for the accumulation of (private) human capital, but also in promoting civicness.
Secondly, the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on self-employment indicate that occupational status mat-
ters and the correlation with tax morale is negative. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow
us to address the interesting causality issue of whether people with lower intrinsic motivation to
pay taxes self-select into the self-employment or self-employed people develop a lower tax morale
because of their work status. Third, there are interesting eﬀects related to town size and regional
area. Living in Southern Italy exerts a negative eﬀect too. Also, it turns out that Southerners
are the least motivated regional group in terms of the commitment to paying taxes5Further, in
5It is surprising that Southerners agree less with the “Redistributive” aspect of tax morale given the well-known
higher poverty rate observed in the South (European Commission, 2003) and the fact that most redistributive transfers
10line with our descriptive analysis, with regard to Kantian, Community and Redistributive, a town
size eﬀect emerges, as citizens living in big towns are less morally concerned than citizens living
in small towns. This seems to indicate that people living in smaller towns develop a greater sense
of community, leading to greater civicness. This ﬁnding is in line with Olson (1965)’s thesis that
small groups are qualitatively diﬀerent from large ones. According to Olson, in many cases small
groups are more eﬃcient and viable than large ones and, other things equal, free riding is more
likely to emerge in the latter than in the former environments. Finally, the positive and signiﬁcant
estimated coeﬃcient on log income suggests that the “Kantian” attitude is a normal good. Income
and reference income are both signiﬁcant for the Vertical motive: people with higher income are
less likely to agree with the statement while as the reference income increases (and hence there is
a worsening in the relative position of the individual) the probability of choosing the answer “Very
much” increases. Thus, it seems that the only aspect in which relative income matters is when
evaluating the government behavior in terms of eﬃcient use of the tax revenue.
Estimation results for the two indices are quite similar. Age is signiﬁcant and exerts a positive
inﬂuence on tax morale, while the eﬀect of gender is unclear given that it is signiﬁcant for TM1
and not for TM2. As expected, the eﬀect of education is important in determining tax morale,
with higher educational levels raising tax morale6. Besides the speciﬁc stock of human capital
accumulated at each educational level, attending school provides an important positive, independent
eﬀect on the opinions on public spirit and taxation: this suggests that, apart from the private return
to schooling, there might be a social (diﬃcult to measure though) return to schooling given by the
increased civicness it might induce. Self-employment has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on both tax
morale indices and living in a big town weakens one’s moral attitude towards taxation, as well as
living in the South of Italy. Individual income is an important determinant of the views on ﬁscal
morality (while the negative coeﬃcient on reference income is not signiﬁcant) supporting the view
that tax morale behaves like a “normal good”. Finally, the intrinsic motivation to be interested in
political life or to act as to improve the general well-being of a society induces a higher tax morale.
3. Happiness and tax morale
Now that we have a better sense of the key determinants of tax morale, we can explore its eﬀects
on self-reported happiness. Over the centuries, the link between ethics and happiness has often
from the central government are indeed in favor of these regions.
6F-tests reject both the null hypothesis of no eﬀect of education (F = 15.19) and of no diﬀerential eﬀect across
educational levels (F = 16.89). The null hypothesis that a junior high school degree provides no further eﬀects with
respect to primary school is rejected (t-test equal to 4.31) as is the null hypothesis that a high school degree induces
no additional eﬀects over junior high school (a t-test of equality is equal to 4.20).
11captured the attention of philosophers (including classical thinkers like Aristotle and St. Thomas
Aquinas, the leading ﬁgures within the framework of the so called “eudaimonistic tradition”). While
according to the hedonistic approach happiness is identiﬁed with the individual pleasure associated
with the attainment of a private outcome, the eudaimonistic one relates happiness and human
ﬂourishing to virtuous behavior.
With a few exceptions, so far happiness studies have not empirically focused on the connection
between happiness and ethics. For instance, James (2003) derives explicitly from a theoretical
model a causal link from ethical judgments to happiness and, using data from the 1995-97 wave of
the World Value Survey, provides some evidence that ethics aﬀects happiness. However, he does not
explore an economically relevant form of morality such as tax morale. Bruni and Stanca (2008), in
their work on TV consumption, relational goods and happiness, also present evidence that honesty
and happiness are positively correlated. Similarly, Verme (2009), in his empirical investigation on
happiness and freedom of choice, ﬁnds that individuals who have an indulgent attitude towards tax
cheating are more unhappy.
The commonsense view about happiness and individual ﬁscal behavior is that (successfully)
cheating on taxes is what makes you ‘happy’, as you save money and get access to public (and
therefore non-excludable) goods. Since undetected tax evasion yields pecuniary beneﬁts to the free
rider, such behavior appears to be fully consistent with the utility maximizing behavior of a selﬁsh
economic man. As a consequence, the economic literature on tax compliance has always considered
‘puzzling’ the relatively high levels of compliance systematically observed in the Western world (see
Andreoni et al., 1998). However, there exists sizeable empirical evidence suggesting that several
non-pecuniary factors turn out to be signiﬁcant determinants of happiness. The set of questions
discussed in the previous section gives us the opportunity to investigate the eﬀect of the two tax
morale scores as well as of the diﬀerent aspects of ﬁscal morality on happiness. The happiness
question contained in the SHIW 2004 questionnaire, oﬀering ten response categories, is given by:
Happiness: Looking at every aspect of your life, how happy would you say you are?
Please answer on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is “Very unhappy”, 10 is “Very happy” and
the ﬁgures in between indicate various degrees of response.
Summary statistics and the empirical distribution of happiness are reported in Table 1 and in Figure
4. Apart from minor diﬀerences in wording, this happiness question is similar to the one present
in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which has happiness data on a scale from 0 to 10,
whereas in the General Social Survey carried out by the National Opinion Research Center in the
U.S. only three response categories are present. Finally, a four-part life satisfaction question in the
12Euro-Barometer Survey Series for 1975-1992 has been used by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005)7.
The happiness equation we estimate is given by
Hi = α + β0TMi + x′
iγ + ǫi (1)
where Hi stands for the stated happiness level of individual i and TMi is the tax morale of individual
i (it could be either the score from an aggregate index or the response in a single question). The
parameter β0 captures the eﬀect of tax morale on subjective well-being. Our main interest is in
testing the null hypothesis that tax morale exerts no inﬂuence on happiness, i.e., β0 = 0. Rejection
of the null hypothesis would then provide some evidence that tax morale impacts on happiness.
As in the previous section, a set of demographics and economic controls, xi, is also included in the
regression. In more detail, we include age, gender, marital status, education, employment status,
household size and composition, town size, regional macro-area and both log income y and log
reference income yR. The coeﬃcient on reference income is expected to be negative because of
the negative correlation with happiness. In fact, if reference income increases the individual would
experience a worsening in relative terms (with respect to the reference group). Hence, insofar as
he is concerned not only with absolute income but also with relative income his happiness level is
expected to fall (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).
Even though we posit that the standing on tax issues could be a determinant of stated hap-
piness, in principle we cannot rule out that one’s happiness level also aﬀects the moral attitude
towards taxation. In other words, like for other non-pecuniary determinants of happiness such as
political participation, volunteering, marriage , relational goods, and religiosity a positive correla-
tion between happiness and tax morale could reﬂect reverse causation. Therefore, it is natural to
explicitly address the following question: does honesty make taxpayers happy, or are happier people
more likely to report honestly? Because of this endogeneity problem, OLS would yield inconsistent
estimates and we need to resort to estimation by instrumental variables (IV).
Finding appropriate instruments is, in general, a diﬃcult task. Given our dataset, an instru-
mental variable might be obtained considering the respondents’ view about the role of Government
in providing public services. This is captured by the following question:
Role of Government: Considering the Government’s need to guarantee public ser-
vices, please say which statement is closest to your own opinion: (1) The Government’s
duty is to provide all citizens with as many public services as possible (e.g. school,
7In economics, the usage of survey answers about happiness has gained ground and the measures of subjective
well-being exhibit high consistency across countries (Alesina et al., 2004) and stability over time (Frey and Stutzer,
2000) and are not systematically biased with regard to social desirability (Konow and Earley, 2008).
13health care, pensions, transport, etc.) even if it means heavy taxes; (2) The Govern-
ment has some unavoidable expenses for social welfare, which should be covered by
taxes and duties, increasing these as and when necessary; (3) Taxation is too high, so
if there is not enough money, expenses should be reduced by cutting back services; (4)
The Government should raise the bare minimum in taxes and duties to cover absolutely
essential public services (e.g. defence, justice, the police, etc.) and leave the rest to
private initiative.
In general, most people may be averse to paying taxes, but they may like what they get in
return for it: local and national public services such as education, health care, public transport,
pensions and, more so, police protection, justice, national defense, and so on. It follows that
respondents more favorable than the others to a larger (resp., smaller) Government size, so that the
aforementioned public services are provided even though this entails heavy taxes, might be driven
by a high (resp., low) degree of tax morale. As for the exclusion restriction, in a cross-country study
of 40 nations for the period 1980-1990, Veenhoven (2000) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant connection between
the (objective) size of the welfare state and the level of happiness within the state. The size of
social security expenditure and changes in the social security schemes are not related to higher
or lower levels of citizens’ happiness and do not determine changes in the dispersion of happiness
among citizens. This evidence supports our intuition that it would be diﬃcult to justify some
association between the perceived level of happiness and a respondent’s answer to a normative and
speciﬁc question requiring a rational answer about the desired role of Government in the provision
of public services. Moreover, the empirical literature on happiness provides additional support to
justify our estimation strategy, given that our instrumental variable does not appear in the long list
of determinants of happiness which have been found in more than two decades (see, e.g., the survey
by Dolan et al., 2008). In principle, one might object that the classic left-right ideological divide
plays a major role in driving people’s answers to the above question and that political preferences
are in turn correlated with happiness. However, in this respect, it is worth emphasizing that in
Italy the left-right division is far more blurred and less precisely associated with citizens’ preferences
about Government size than in other countries like, e.g., the U.S.. As to the distinction between
private and public initiative, with regard to socially relevant services, in Italy it is the case that
being a supporter of a heavy welfare state (resp., of a ‘minimal state’) does not necessarily mean
to be ideologically a left-winger (resp., a right-winger). In the light of this, we chose the above
question capturing respondents’ view about the role of Government as our instrument.
The validity of the instruments is assessed using some diagnostic tests. First, we test the identi-
fying power of the instruments using the LM statistic, robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity,
proposed by Kleibergen and Paap (2006). A rejection of the null hypothesis of under-identiﬁcation
14implies that the model is identiﬁed. Secondly, it is well-known that instrumental variable regres-
sions must pay great attention to the issue of the relevance of instruments because weak instruments
may introduce both severe bias in estimators and size distortion in test statistics. Following the
approach in Stock and Yogo (2005), we use the ﬁrst-stage F-statistics to test the null hypothesis of
weak instruments. The null hypothesis is formulated as “the bias of two-stage least squares (TSLS)
or Fuller-k estimators as fraction of the OLS bias is greater than 10%” and “the actual size of the
TSLS or limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) t-test as a fraction of OLS bias is greater
than 10%”. In our settings with three instruments, from Stock and Yogo (2005) the appropriate
critical values for the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic at the 5% signiﬁcance level are given by 13.91 (TSLS
bias), 9.61 (Fuller-k bias), 22.30 (TSLS size) and 6.46 (LIML size). Thus, for example, if the ﬁrst-
stage F-statistic is greater than 13.91 (9.61) the relative bias of TSLS (Fuller-k) as a fraction of
the OLS bias is no greater than 10%. Finally, we consider the usual Hansen’s J statistic to test
the overidentifying restricions (given that we have three instruments and one endogenous variable).
A failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests that the orthogonality conditions are valid and the
instruments are exogenous.
Estimation results are given in Table 9. First, we consider the diagnostic tests for TM1, the
broader tax morale index. Kleibergen-Paap’s LM test of the null of under-identiﬁcation, which has a
χ2
3 asymptotic distribution, is equal to 82.65 allowing us to reject the null. It follows that the model
is identiﬁed. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic is equal to 29.18, well above the critical values indicating
that the instruments are not weak and that TSLS estimates are reliable. Finally, our assumption of
instruments exogeneity ﬁnds statistical support in Hansen’s J test of the overidentifying restrictions
equal to 0.17 with a p-value of 0.91, and the endogeneity of tax morale is conﬁrmed by Hausman’s
H test equal to 10.37.
The TSLS (and LIML) estimate of the causal impact of the tax morale index TM1 on happiness
is given by 0.20 which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The 95% conﬁdence interval based on TSLS
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, given by (0.096,0.301), is quite close to the conﬁdence
interval based on the Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) proposed by Moreira (2003), which guar-
antees conﬁdence intervals with the correct size even in the presence of weak instruments, given by
(0.102,0.311). Neither conﬁdence intervals contain the value of zero, therefore providing statistical
evidence that the tax morale index TM1 has a positive causal eﬀect on happiness. Considering the
TSLS estimate, moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean of the empirical distribution of the tax morale score TM1 generates an average
increase in stated happiness of approximately 0.20 ∗ (3.94 ∗ 2) = 1.58, which is about 90% of one
standard deviation of the empirical distribution of happiness. While this eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant
from a statistical viewpoint, it is also signiﬁcant from an economic perspective, making tax morale
15an important determinant of subjective well-being. As for the TM2 index, the Kleibergen-Paap’s
LM test is equal to 77.91 which allows rejection of the null of under-identiﬁcation. The ﬁrst-stage
F-test is equal to 27.39, well above the critical values reported by Stock and Yogo (2005), and
Hansen’s test of the overidentifyng restriction supports the validity of the orthogonality conditions.
The coeﬃcient on TM2 is 0.26, larger than the previous one and highly signiﬁcant. Again, neither
the TSLS nor Moreira’s conﬁdence intervals contain the value of zero. As for the economic impact
of TM2 on happiness, standard calculations indicate that as we move from one standard deviation
below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean of the empirical distribution of TM2,
the eﬀect on happiness is given by 0.26 ∗ (3.08 ∗ 2) = 1.60, about 90% of one standard deviation of
happiness, testifying that for both tax morale indices we have evidence that tax morale signiﬁcantly
aﬀects happiness.
The role of additional determinants of happiness can also be assessed from Table 9. In accor-
dance with other studies on happiness, happiness is decreasing with age (though at a decreasing
rate) and married people are happier than the others. As expected, unemployed people are less
happy than employed, retired, non-working people and homeowners feel better oﬀ than the others
and, ﬁnally, people living in Northern Italy are happier than those living in Center or South. As
customary in happiness studies, income is a signiﬁcant determinant of happiness while, contrary to
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), in this dataset we do not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant role for reference
income.
Similar remarks apply to the results for the single morality items presented in Table 10. Es-
timation results conﬁrm that the eﬀect of tax morale on happiness is statistically signiﬁcant and
economically relevant for each of the seven items that we have examined. Therefore, we provided
evidence of a causal impact of tax morale on happiness not only by considering items reﬂecting an
unconditional committment towards paying taxes (such as Kantian, Community, Redistributive,
Tax evasion and Tax amnesty), but also by examining statements (such as Vertical and Fairness)
where a form of conditional morality seems to be at work.
In summary, the econometric analysis carried out in this paper reveals that honesty and cheating
generate markedly diﬀerent hedonic consequences: it turns out that either non-pecuniary costs are
associated with cheating (e.g. psychological costs such as anxiety, guilt or a reduction in self-
image, or social costs such as shame or reputation loss) or, symmetrically, non-pecuniary beneﬁts
are associated with honest behavior (e.g., social custom utility) - or both, consistently not only with
models of tax compliance such as Gordon (1989), Bordignon (1993), Erard and Feinstein (1994)
and Myles and Naylor (1996), where these possibilities are considered on theoretical grounds but
also partially with Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who allude to the role of non-pecuniary factors
aﬀecting adversely a cheater’s reputation as a citizen of the community. Our results, obtained
16using real-taxpayers’ opinions on real-world taxes, are in line with the well-known neuroeconomic
experiment on tax compliance run by Harbaugh et al. (2007) who found that even mandatory,
tax-like transfers turn out to elicit neural activity in the volunteers’ ventral striatum, a key part of
the brain’s reward system.
In the next paragraphs, we assess whether our results are robust to the adoption of a diﬀerent
approach to aggregate the single items and to alternative measures of material well-being.
Sensitivity analysis: factor analysis
We evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to the aggregation used to obtain the
tax morale indices following a factor analysis approach. In fact, it might be the case that the seven
single questions capture one or two (or even more) diﬀerent latent aspects of tax morale and that
our economic aggregation approach is not completely justiﬁed on empirical grounds. Brieﬂy, let
y be a (7 × 1) vector containing the response of the ith individual (in deviation from the sample
mean) on our questions. Then, factor analysis posits that y = Λf + ǫ, where Λ is a 7 × p matrix
of factor loading (where p < 7), f is a p-vector of orthogonal common factors and ǫ is a vector of
(seven) error terms. The generic element of Λ, say λij, gives the importance of the jth factor for
the ith variable in y. Thus, each variable can be expressed as a linear combination of some common
factors (with unit variance) plus an error term which accounts for the part of the variable not in
common with the others. It follows that the covariance matrix of the observables can be written as
Σ = ΛΛ′ +Ψ, where Ψ is the diagonal variance-covariance matrix of ǫ. The standard assumption
of no correlation between the ǫs implies that the common factors explain all the correlations among
the observables (for a general exposition of factor analysis see Rencher, 2002).
Estimation of the factors is carried out using the principal factor method starting from the
polychoric correlation matrix in Table 5, say R, thus factoring R − ˆ Ψ in practice, and using
(1 − 1/rii) as initial estimate of the diagonal elements of Ψ, where rii is the ith diagonal element
of R−1. Next, a choice has to be made about the number of factors. Even though there exist
several criteria that can be used as guidance in this decision, such as the number of eigenvalues
greater than 1 (or zero when R − ˆ Ψ is used), the scree test, and parallel analysis8, this is a rather
subjective step, exacerbated by the fact that in many datasets the number of relevant factors may
8The scree plot is a plot of the eigenvalues. The idea is to select the number of eigenvalues before the last sharp
drop in the graph. In the parallel analysis, the idea is to compare the observed eigenvalues with those obtained under
no correlation. Thus, a factor analysis on a matrix of independent random data is carried out for a large number
of times and the eigenvalues stored. Then, when the eigenvalue that corresponds to the 95th of the distribution of
eigenvalues derived from the random data is larger than the eigenvalues from the factor analysis, the corresponding
factor is retained.
17not be obvious. In our case, looking at the eigenvalues of R − ˆ Ψ, the scree plot, and the output
from the parallel analysis seem to suggest that two latent common factors can be kept (see Figure
5). The resulting matrix of factor loadings is reported in Table 11. Inspection of the entries in this
table reveals that the ﬁrst factor is important for the ﬁrst four questions (and marginally important
for the ﬁfth) and that the second factor is relevant for the last two items. However, the variance
unique to each variable is large indicating that the common factors explain little of the variation
of the variables. This result is hardly surprising given the absence of a well structured pattern of
correlations in the matrix of polychoric correlations.
The structure of the ﬁrst factor is in accordance with our deﬁnition of the aggregate tax morale
index TM2 but for the last question. Therefore, we estimate the happiness equation (1), again by
IV methods, using a tax morale index, say TM∗
2, obtained aggregating the four questions Kantian,
Redistributive, Community and Tax evasion. Results are reported in Table 12. According to the
LM test, which rejects the null of under-identiﬁcation, the model is identiﬁed. Instruments are
not weak (F-test well above the critical values) and they pass Hansen’s exogeneity test. The TSLS
estimate of the coeﬃcient on tax morale is given by 0.24, it is statistically signiﬁcant and slightly
lower but not substantially diﬀerent from the previous estimate of 0.26 obtained using the index
TM2. Therefore, estimation results obtained using TM∗
2 indicate that our aggregation approach
based on economic grounds is robust to the aggregation suggested by factor analysis.
Sensitivity analysis: Measures of material well-being
We now repeat our instrumental variable estimation using two alternative measures of the
material well-being of the household. Table 13 reports estimation results when income is replaced
by ﬁnancial and real wealth (Panel A), an alternative objective measure of material well-being,
and by the answer to the question “Is your household’s disposable income enough for you to get
through the month?” (Panel B), a subjective assessment of the general living conditions of the
household (answers are on a scale from 1, great deal of diﬃculty, to 6, very easily). We notice
that the estimates of the tax morale scores (both TM1 and TM2) are little aﬀected by the choice
of income, ﬁnancial and real wealth, and living conditions as measures of the material well-being.
Instrumental variable conﬁdence intervals robust to the weak instruments issue do not include the
value of zero, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of no inﬂuence of tax morale on happiness.
The estimated coeﬃcients on ﬁnancial wealth quintile are increasing with ﬁnancial wealth, at a
decreasing rate though, as the coeﬃcients on real wealth. Financial and real wealth exert a positive
inﬂuence on happiness, with respondents in the ﬁrst quintile of the distribution being signiﬁcantly
less happy than those in higher quintiles. The same pattern is observed in Panel B where we are
using a perceived measure of material well-being: as disposable income allows the household to get
18through the month more easily, a higher eﬀect on happiness is observed.
The eﬀect of the single components of the tax morale scores can also be assessed using this
approach. In all cases, we shall consider a binary endogenous regressor for the single tax morale
item, built using as cut-oﬀ point either the answer “Very much” or “Not at all” according to which
has the highest morality content. In Table 10, we report for each tax morale motive the ﬁrst-stage
F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Given that the F-statistic is smaller
than the critical values, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis for the Vertical motive and for
Tax Amnesty. Point estimates for these tax morale items are reported for completeness but should
be interpreted with great care and robust conﬁdence intervals based on CLR approach are so wide
that any meaningful economic interpretation is hazardous.
However, when the null of weak instruments can be rejected, estimation results are interesting.
First of all, the eﬀect generated by a Kantian moral attitude comes out neatly. The positive
estimated coeﬃcient indicates that Kantian-like, unconditionally committed individuals are happier
than the others and that a behavioral shift towards such a moral attitude might induce a substantial
increase in self-reported happiness. The coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant from a statistical viewpoint,
the 95% TSLS (or CLR) conﬁdence interval does not contain the value of zero. The eﬀect is
economically important given that the increase in stated happiness is estimated in 1.949, which is
about one standard deviation of the empirical distribution of happiness. From Hansen’s J test of
overidentiﬁcation we ﬁnd supporting evidence in favor of our assumption of instruments exogeneity
while Hausman’s H test corroborates our decision not to rely on OLS estimation.
Table 14 reports estimation results using alternative measures of material well-being with respect
to income, as done for the tax morale scores. Again, results obtained using ﬁnancial and real wealth
or the subjective perception of own living conditions are similar to those obtained using disposable
income conﬁrming the robustness of our ﬁndings.
4. Conclusion
In philosophy, important classical contributions, mainly in the Aristotlean tradition, have ar-
gued that a relevant nexus exists between human morality and happiness. Within the eudaimonistic
school, virtuous people are considered happier because they perceive the beauty of virtuous actions
and acting virtuously increases their degree of happiness. Morality there is viewed as the science
of the roads (the virtues) leading man to the achievement of the major goal of life, that is true
happiness. However, surprisingly, the recent and growing psychology and economics literature on
happiness has not investigated a philosophically well-known and signiﬁcant determinant of happi-
ness such as human morality. Our work aims at ﬁlling this gap, with regard to an economically
19relevant form of morality such as tax morale, and points to a causal link from tax morale to hap-
piness: we have adduced strong evidence that people with higher tax morale are happier than the
others, even after controlling for the main demographic and socioeconomic determinants of happi-
ness. We obtain this result by considering two composite indices of ﬁscal morality as well as several
single tax morale items.
This connection also contributes to address the central puzzle in the literature on tax compliance,
by shedding light on the motives at the basis of the seemingly irrational willingness of many
taxpayers to comply even when measures of enforcement aimed at deterring evasion (such as audit
rates and expected penalties) are weak or absent. The puzzle is that many people pay taxes even
when the chance to be monitored and sanctioned is extremely low. Why do they do it? Why
are so many households honest, and why don’t cheaters cheat more (Andreoni et al., 1998, p.
821)? Despite last decades’ numerous attempts to solve this puzzle, the answer remains elusive.
The standard models of tax compliance assuming that individuals are driven by material self-
interest only cannot account for such behavior, as tax cheating has traditionally been modeled as
an independently-made amoral gamble, as if it were just adding one more risky asset to a household’s
portfolio. By contrast, empirical evidence (including experimental studies) unambiguously indicates
that the levels of tax compliance are far higher than simple risk-return models predict.
Our results suggest that people pay taxes also because they like it: due to a sense of moral
obligation, they feel intrinsically motivated to do it and this generates positive hedonic eﬀects,
in line with the classic eudaimonistic argument recalled above. As Gintis et al. (2008) observe,
“Because of our nature as moral beings, humans take pleasure in acting ethically and are pained
when acting unethically” (p. 1). In turn, the discovery that paying taxes is rewarding in itself
helps explain why some people developed a moral preference for honest reporting.
More generally, our major result is consistent with the view of human morality emerging from
last decades’ behavioral experiments - run both with students in advanced societies and people from
small-scale developing societies: these studies systematically indicate that most individuals treat
moral values as ends in themselves (Gintis et al., 2008). Despite rapid advances in the last years,
much work remains to be done if we are to achieve a satisfactory understanding of the sources
of subjective well-being within developed economies. Identifying non-material determinants of
happiness like human morality seems to be a crucial step to be taken along this ambitious path.
20Alesina, A., Tella, R.D., MacCulloch, R., 2004. Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and
Americans diﬀerent? Journal of Public Economics 88, 2009–2042.
Allingham, M., Sandmo, A., 1972. Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis. Journal of Public
Economics 1, 323–338.
Andreoni, J., Erard, B., Feinstein, J., 1998. Tax compliance. Journal of Economic Literature 36,
818–860.
Banﬁeld, E., 1925. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Free Press, New York.
Bordignon, M., 1993. A fairness approach to income tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics 52,
345–362.
Bruni, L., Stanca, L., 2008. Watching alone: Relational goods, television and happiness. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 65, 506–528.
Cadsby, C.B., Maynes, E., Trivedi, V., 2006. Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home
and in the lab: A new experimental approach. Experimental Economics 9, 343–359.
Clark, A., Lelkes, O., 2009. Let us pray: religious interactions in life satisfaction. PSE Working
Papers 2009-01. PSE (Ecole normale superieure).
Cummings, R., Martinez-Vazquez, J., McKee, M., Torgler, B., 2009. Tax morale aﬀects tax compli-
ance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual ﬁeld experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 70.
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R., 2005. Partisan social happiness. The Review of Economic Studies
72, 367–393.
Dolan, P., Peasgood, T., White, M., 2008. Do we really know what makes us happy a review of the
economic literature on the factors associated with subjective well-being. Journal of Economic
Psychology 29, 94–122.
Erard, B., Feinstein, J.S., 1994. Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game. RAND Journal
of Economics 25, 1–19.
European Commission, 2003. Poverty and Social Exclusion in Italy. Annex to the NAP 2003.
European Commission.
Feld, L., Frey, B., 2002. Trust breeds trust: how taxpayers are treated. Economics of Governance
3, 87–99.
21Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A., 2005. Income and well-being: an empirical analysis of the comparison income
eﬀect. Journal of Public Economics 89, 997–1019.
Frey, B.S., Stutzer, A., 2000. Happiness, economy and institutions. Economic Journal 110, 918–38.
Frey, B.S., Torgler, B., 2007. Tax morale and conditional cooperation. Journal of Comparative
Economics 35, 136–159.
Gintis, H., Henrich, J., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., Fehr, E., 2008. Strong reciprocity and the roots of
human morality. Social Justice Research 21, 241–253.
Gordon, J., 1989. Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European
Economic Review 33, 797–805.
Halla, M., 2010a. The Link between the Intrinsic Motivation to Comply and Compliance Behavior:
A Critical Appraisal of Existing Evidence. Discussion Paper. IZA.
Halla, M., 2010b. Tax Morale and Compliance Behavior: First Evidence on a Causal Link. Working
Paper. Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
Harbaugh, W.T., Mayr, U., Burghart, D.R., 2007. Neural responses to taxation and voluntary
giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science 316, 1622–1625.
Harsanyi, J., 1980. Rule utilitarianism, rights, obligations, and the theory of rational behavior.
Theory and Decision 12, 115–133.
Herwartzy, H., Schneiderz, F., Tafenau, E., 2010. One share ﬁts all? Regional variations in the
extent of shadow economy in Europe. Working Paper.
James, H.J., 2003. Are happy people ethical people? Evidence from North America and Europe.
mimeo. Agribusiness Research Institute.
Kleibergen, F., Paap, R., 2006. Generalized rank tests using the singular value decomposition.
Journal of Econometrics 127, 97–126.
Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoﬀ? A cross-country investi-
gation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1251–1288.
Konow, J., Earley, J., 2008. The hedonistic paradox: Is homo economicus happier? Journal of
Public Economics 92, 1–33.
Moreira, M.J., 2003. A conditional likelihood ratio test for structural models. Econometrica 71,
1027–1048.
22Myles, G., Naylor, R., 1996. A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs.
European Journal of Political Economy 12, 49–66.
Olson, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
Putnam, R., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton (NJ).
Rencher, A., 2002. Methods of Multivariate Analysis. Wiley, New York.
Smith, K., 1992. Reciprocity and fairness: Positive incentives for tax compliance, in: Slemrod, J.
(Ed.), Why People Pay Taxes. Tax Compliance and Enforcement. University of Michigan Press,
pp. 223–250.
Spicer, M., Lundstedt, S., 1976. Understanding tax evasion. Public Finance 31, 295–305.
Stock, J., Yogo, M., 2005. Testing for weak instruments in linear iv regression, in: Andrews, D.,
Stock, J. (Eds.), Identiﬁcation and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas
Rothenberg. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 80–108.
Stutzer, A., Frey, B., 2006. Does marriage make people happy, or do happy people get married?
The Journal of Socio-Economics 35, 326–347.
Sugden, R., 1984. Reciprocity: The supply of public goods through voluntary contributions. Eco-
nomic Journal 94, 772–87.
Tabellini, G., 2008. Institutions and culture. Journal of the European Economic Association 6,
255–294.
Thoits, P.A., Hewitt, L., 2001. Volunteer work and well-being. Journal of Health and Social
Behavior 42, 115–131.
Torgler, B., Schaﬀner, M., Macintyre, A., 2007. Tax Compliance, Tax Morale and Governance
Quality. Working Paper Series. CREMA.
Torgler, B., Schneider, F., 2009. The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow
economy. Journal of Economic Psychology 30.
Veenhoven, R., 2000. Weelbeing in the welfare state. Journal of Conparative Policy Analysis 2,
91–125.
23Verme, P., 2009. Happiness, freedom and control. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
71, 146–161.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 1. Summary statistics.
Data are from SHIW 2004, household heads born in odd years. The table reports means and
standard deviations for the main variables used in the paper. Income and wealth are in thousand
euros. The sample size is 3795. Summary statistics for amounts invested in the diﬀerent forms of
savings are computed using data on households holding these assets.
















= 1 0.251 0.43
≥ 2 but ≤ 4 0.680 0.46











Financial assets 24.15 59.00
Real assets 218.00 341.33
Currency and savings accounts (n=3134) 13.40 39.39
Government bonds (n=327) 29.25 47.54
Other bonds (n=269) 25.32 41.64
Stocks (n=283) 24.68 42.27
Mutual funds (n=388) 36.53 61.67
Pension funds (n=339) 14.58 18.86
Life insurance (n=472) 15.62 18.10
Is your household’s disposable income enough for you to get through the month?






27Table 2. Tax Morale
Kantian Community Vertical Fairness Redistributive
Not at all 0.87 2.40 11.02 19.52 4.65
Very little 4.66 8.56 16.79 23.87 10.36
So-so 15.56 23.35 27.15 28.82 24.56
Quite a lot 41.32 34.23 30.57 19.77 39.21
Very much 37.63 31.46 14.47 8.01 21.22
Table 3. Tax Evasion
Very serious 31.70
Serious 45.61
The same as any other 19.50
Marginal 2.48
Non-existent 0.71
Table 4. Tax Amnesties
Good system and should be granted as often as possible to recover some of the lost revenue 12.41
Good system, but should be used sparingly so as not to encourage tax evaders 23.87
Unfair but necessary method of balancing the national accounts 18.71
Very unfair system because they discourage honest citizens 31.30
Don’t know 13.70
Table 5. Polychoric correlation matrix
Data are from SHIW 2004, household heads born in odd years. The table reports the polychoric
correlations between pairs of questions. The sample size is 3277.
Kantian Community Redistributive Tax evasion Tax amnesty Vertical Fairness
Kantian 1
Community 0.594 1
Redistributive 0.412 0.337 1
Tax evasion 0.372 0.414 0.208 1
Tax amnesty 0.229 0.171 0.118 0.204 1
Vertical 0.118 0.038 0.034 0.123 0.057 1
Fairness 0.232 0.194 0.054 0.188 0.103 0.357 1
28Table 6. Tax Morale by groups (Columns sum to unity)
Male Female Employed Self- Unemployed Small Medium Big North Center South
employed Town Town Town
Paying taxes is one of the basic duties of citizenship
Not at all/Very little 5.24 5.99 5.52 5.60 9.38 4.40 7.08 4.83 5.38 4.39 6.52
So-so 13.84 18.73 14.46 15.82 16.67 13.72 16.80 22.36 12.51 13.88 21.42
Quite a lot 39.84 43.26 39.89 45.01 39.58 42.62 40.03 38.07 40.94 36.65 44.52
Very much 41.08 32.02 40.13 33.58 34.38 39.27 36.10 34.74 41.17 45.08 27.54
Not paying taxes is one of the worst crimes a person can commit because it harms the whole community
Not at all 2.36 2.45 1.95 3.16 4.17 2.72 2.19 1.51 2.98 2.02 1.85
Very little 8.25 9.06 8.29 10.22 12.50 7.54 9.59 9.67 9.77 5.81 8.78
So-so 21.57 26.16 23.40 26.52 26.04 21.78 23.68 30.82 20.18 20.17 29.87
Quite a lot 33.65 35.15 34.12 34.31 28.12 34.82 34.04 31.72 32.46 37.37 34.54
Very much 34.16 27.18 32.25 25.79 29.17 33.14 30.50 26.28 34.62 34.64 24.96
People try to avoid paying tax because they know the Government spends the money badly
Not at all 11.26 10.29 13.81 9.49 12.50 10.58 11.58 9.37 9.82 12.81 11.03
Very little 17.06 16.55 18.36 13.38 13.54 15.55 18.60 16.31 19.06 15.42 14.81
So-so 25.23 30.45 23.48 24.57 18.75 28.17 25.61 29.61 26.73 28.11 27.38
Quite a lot 31.50 29.29 30.38 33.09 34.38 30.63 30.95 29.31 31.29 30.96 29.55
Very much 14.95 13.42 13.97 19.46 20.83 15.08 13.26 15.41 13.10 12.69 17.23
It is right not to pay taxes if you think they are unfair
Not at all 20.67 17.44 23.88 18.00 13.54 18.95 20.40 17.52 20.94 19.57 17.23
Very little 23.59 23.64 22.34 25.79 16.67 22.41 25.23 22.96 26.20 24.79 19.24
So-so 27.85 30.99 27.78 27.25 28.13 30.99 26.51 29.91 27.25 29.54 31.24
Quite a lot 19.34 20.57 18.12 18.98 28.13 18.53 20.66 23.26 17.54 20.17 22.71
Very much 8.55 7.36 7.88 9.98 13.54 9.11 7.21 6.34 8.07 5.93 9.58
It is right to pay taxes because it helps the weak
Not at all 4.38 4.90 5.36 6.57 5.21 4.66 4.44 4.83 4.21 3.20 6.04
Continued on next page
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9Table 6: Tax Morale by groups (continued)
Male Female Employed Self- Unemployed Small Medium Big North Center South
employed Town Town Town
Very little 10.06 10.63 11.13 11.68 12.50 9.32 10.81 13.29 9.88 8.42 12.08
So-so 22.99 27.66 22.66 24.82 21.88 25.34 24.20 24.47 21.11 25.39 29.47
Quite a lot 40.35 37.47 40.37 37.23 38.54 38.38 39.70 41.99 41.64 39.26 35.91
Very much 22.22 19.35 20.47 19.71 21.88 22.30 20.85 15.41 23.16 23.72 16.51
Generally speaking, among the problems facing the Government, that of tax evasion is:
Very serious 34.04 28.00 32.98 24.57 31.25 31.88 32.24 28.10 29.65 40.33 28.66
Serious 45.29 46.12 45.74 48.18 37.50 45.65 46.20 42.60 49.42 42.70 42.35
The same as any other 17.96 21.93 18.28 23.11 28.13 18.85 19.11 25.08 17.89 14.12 25.36
Marginal/Non-existent 2.71 3.95 3.01 4.14 3.13 3.61 2.45 4.23 3.04 2.85 3.62
Tax Amnesties:
Good and often 13.92 15.21 11.75 14.21 24.39 13.14 16.24 12.31 10.69 14.25 19.74
Good if rare 27.10 29.27 29.10 26.81 20.73 24.70 30.91 31.34 24.55 28.63 32.08
Unfair but necessary 21.00 22.28 20.57 23.86 20.73 21.52 20.28 26.87 25.03 16.48 19.84
Very unfair 37.99 33.24 38.58 35.12 34.15 40.63 32.56 29.48 39.72 40.64 28.33
3
0Table 7. Opinions on Taxation - Tax Morale Indices
The sample consists of household heads born in odd years. The excluded group is given by single male blue
collar workers, living in a city with less than 40.000 inhabitants located in Northern Italy with ﬁnancial
wealth and real assets holding in the ﬁrst quintile of the corresponding empirical distributions. The sample
size is 3275.
TM1: a tax morale index index built using all items in Table 2-4.
TM2: a tax morale index including the Kantian, Redistributive, Community, Tax Evasion and Tax Amnesty
items.
+: signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1%.
TM1 TM2
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.
Age 0.112∗∗ 0.033 0.079∗∗ 0.025
Age2/100 -0.070∗ 0.028 -0.046∗ 0.022
Female 0.221∗ 0.173 0.025 0.136
Married 0.045 0.282 0.168 0.221
Divorced -0.351 0.317 -0.365 0.258
Widowed -0.320 0.285 -0.341 0.230
Primary School 0.389 0.302 0.337 0.256
J.High School 0.961∗∗ 0.342 0.576∗ 0.284
High School 1.864∗∗ 0.373 1.117∗∗ 0.302
College 2.028∗∗ 0.476 1.160∗∗ 0.374
Selfemployed -1.245∗∗ 0.221 -0.748∗∗ 0.174
Retired 0.223 0.228 0.182 0.181
Unemployed -.7320 0.459 -0.282 0.369
Not Working -1.138∗∗ 0.284 -0.825 0.228
Income Earners ≥ 2 -.1432 0.235 -0.106 0.181
Household size= 2 -.3232 0.238 -0.308 0.194
Household size> 2 0.026 0.287 -0.049 0.231
Kids ≤ 5 0.017 0.274 -0.005 0.216
Home Owner 0.013 0.180 -0.086 0.146
Medium Town -0.275∗ 0.139 -0.451∗∗ 0.111
Big Town -0.890∗∗ 0.244 -0.750∗∗ 0.191
Area: Center 0.205 0.171 0.229+ 0.132
Area: South -0.920∗∗ 0.184 -0.693∗∗ 0.149
ln(y) 0.447∗∗ 0.148 0.257∗ 0.117
ln(yR) -0.299 0.285 -0.047 0.221
Politics 0.849∗∗ 0.164 0.479∗∗ 0.126
Associations 0.979∗∗ 0.192 0.777∗∗ 0.144
Intercept 18.393∗∗ 20.622 13.246∗∗ 2.0644
n 3275 3275
F-test 18.15 15.43
Adj. R2 0.123 0.105
31Table 8. Opinions on Taxation - Tax Morale Items
The sample consists of household heads born in odd years. The excluded group is given by single male blue collar workers, living in a city with
less than 40.000 inhabitants located in Northern Italy with ﬁnancial wealth and real assets holding in the ﬁrst quintile of the corresponding
empirical distributions. The sample size is 3813. +: signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1%.
Kantian Community Redistributive Vertical Fairness Tax Evasion Tax Amnesty
Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E. Coeﬀ. S.E.




+ 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.020
∗ 0.010
Age
2/100 0.003 0.008 -0.004 0.008 -0.021
∗∗ 0.008 0.015
+ 0.008 0.007 0.008 -0.010 0.008 -0.017
+ 0.009
Female -0.035 0.047 -0.065 0.045 0.075
+ 0.045 -0.163
∗∗ 0.044 -0.096
∗ 0.045 -0.045 0.046 -0.017 0.051
Married 0.042 0.075 0.121
+ 0.073 0.029 0.073 0.092 0.072 -0.063 0.072 0.144
+ 0.074 -0.000 0.083
Divorced -0.073 0.085 -0.156
+ 0.083 -0.213
∗∗ 0.083 0.060 0.082 0.047 0.082 0.150
+ 0.085 0.035 0.092
Widowed 0.025 0.078 -0.054 0.076 -0.154





∗ 0.080 -0.080 0.079 0.256
∗∗ 0.082 0.143 0.102
J.High School 0.378
∗∗ 0.096 0.501
∗∗ 0.094 0.076 0.092 -0.323
∗∗ 0.092 -0.310
∗∗ 0.092 0.187











∗∗ 0.129 0.177 0.126 -0.546
∗∗ 0.126 -0.612










∗ 0.067 0.078 0.065 0.125
∗ 0.063 0.046 0.063 -0.024 0.063 0.066 0.066 0.026 0.070
Unemployed 0.181 0.119 0.053 0.115 0.151 0.114 0.127 0.114 0.300
∗∗ 0.112 -0.075 0.117 -0.207 0.131
Not Working -0.064 0.077 -0.048 0.075 -0.262
∗∗ 0.074 0.117 0.074 0.219
∗∗ 0.074 -0.035 0.077 -0.138 0.085
Income Earners ≥ 2 -0.133
+ 0.069 0.089 0.067 -0.243
∗∗ 0.065 -0.016 0.065 0.105 0.065 -0.006 0.068 0.036 0.072
Household size= 2 0.108
+ 0.065 -0.129
∗ 0.063 -0.120
+ 0.063 -0.022 0.062 -0.032 0.062 0.119
+ 0.065 0.074 0.072
Household size> 2 0.183
∗ 0.079 -0.139
+ 0.076 -0.081 0.075 -0.009 0.075 -0.115 0.075 0.105 0.078 0.014 0.086
Kids ≤ 5 0.065 0.074 -0.053 0.071 0.161
∗ 0.071 -0.109 0.070 -0.049 0.070 0.014 0.074 0.128 0.078
Home Owner -0.109
∗ 0.049 -0.020 0.047 -0.051 0.046 -0.065 0.046 0.007 0.046 -0.029 0.048 -0.029 0.053
Medium Town -0.176
∗∗ 0.044 -0.113
∗∗ 0.043 -0.022 0.042 -0.095






∗∗ 0.055 -0.030 0.054 -0.035 0.055 -0.026 0.057 -0.284
∗∗ 0.062






∗∗ 0.051 0.001 0.049 -0.188
∗∗ 0.049 0.011 0.048 0.119
∗ 0.048 0.029 0.051 -0.249
∗∗ 0.055
ln(y) 0.145
∗∗ 0.042 0.048 0.041 0.029 0.040 -0.074
+ 0.040 -0.026 0.040 0.059 0.042 0.044 0.045
ln(yR) 0.081 0.080 0.028 0.078 -0.005 0.076 0.250













∗ 0.054 0.081 0.056 0.232
∗∗ 0.059
Cut1 1.407
+ 0.737 -0.075 0.714 -0.407 0.702 -0.840 0.699 -1.356
+ 0.700 0.211 0.725 0.276 0.782
Cut2 2.235
∗∗ 0.738 0.567 0.714 0.233 0.702 -0.209 0.699 -0.692 0.699 0.750 0.725 1.164 0.783
Cut3 3.450
∗∗ 0.739 1.394






∗ 0.699 0.855 0.700 2.353
∗∗ 0.725
n 3814.000 3814.000 3814.000 3814.000 3814.000 3814.000 3272.000
Pseudo R
2 0.043 0.023 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.014 0.022
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2Table 9. Happiness and Tax Morale - TSLS Estimation.
The sample consists of household heads born in odd years taken from SHIW 2004. The excluded group is given
by single male blue collar workers, living in a city with less than 40.000 inhabitants located in Northern Italy
with ﬁnancial wealth and real assets holding in the ﬁrst quintile of the corresponding empirical distributions.
Dependent Variable: Stated Happiness. Tax Morale indices are deﬁned in Table 7. The sample size is 3275.
Instruments: Dummy variable deﬁned on opinions on the following statements: The Government’s duty is
to provide all citizens with as many public services as possible (e.g. school, health care, pensions, transport,
etc.) even if it means heavy taxes; The Government has some unavoidable expenses for social welfare, which
should be covered by taxes and duties, increasing these as and when necessary; Taxation is too high, so if
there is not enough money, expenses should be reduced by cutting back services; The Government should
raise the bare minimum in taxes and duties to cover absolutely essential public services (e.g. defence, justice,
the police, etc.) and leave the rest to private initiative.
LM: Kleibergen and Paap (2006)’s LM test of under-identiﬁcation, , distributed as a χ2
3; F (ﬁrst stage): ﬁrst
stage F-test statistics; J (overidentiﬁcation): Hansen’s test of overidentifying restriction, distributed as a
χ2
2; H: Hausman’s test of endogeneity, distributed as a χ2
1; CLR conﬁdence interval: weak instrument robust
95% conﬁdence interval for β0 based on the Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test, Moreira (2003); CLR
(p-value): p-value of the weak instrument robust CLR test of the null hypothesis H0 : β0, Moreira (2003).
+: signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1%.
TM1 TM1



















Primary School -0.119 0.169 -0.129 0.174
J.High School -0.047 0.192 -0.005 0.192
High School -0.003 0.216 0.077 0.209
College -0.154 0.258 -0.052 0.249
Self-employed 0.121 0.112 0.067 0.107




Not working -0.055 0.148 -0.067 0.148
Income Earners ≥ 2 0.086 0.105 0.085 0.105
Household size= 2 0.066 0.123 0.082 0.125
Household size> 2 -0.147 0.142 -0.129 0.145




Medium town -0.073 0.068 -0.010 0.073










log(yR) 0.002 0.133 -0.047 0.135
Politics 0.023 0.089 0.067
∗ 0.083
Associations 0.067 0.098 0.060 0.099
Intercept 2.717 1.570 2.936 1.544
LM [p-value] 82.65 [0.00] 77.91 [0.00]
F 29.18 27.39
J [p-value] 0.17 [0.91] 0.04 [0.99]
H [p-value] 10.37 [0.00] 12.14 [0.00]
CLR (0.102,0.311) (0.133,0.409)
33Table 10. Happiness and Tax Morale Items - TSLS estimates.
The sample consists of household heads born in odd years taken from SHIW 2004. The excluded group is given by single male blue collar
workers, living in a city with less than 40.000 inhabitants located in Northern Italy with ﬁnancial wealth and real assets holding in the ﬁrst
quintile of the corresponding empirical distributions.
Dependent Variable: Stated Happiness.
Kantian: 1, if “Very much” in the Kantian question, 0 otherwise;
Community: 1, if “Very much” in the Community question, 0 otherwise;
Redistributive: 1, if “Not at all” in the Redistributive question, 0 otherwise;
Instruments and Tests: see Table 9.
Following the approach in Stock and Yogo (2005), the null hypothesis of weak instruments is expressed as “the bias of TSLS (Fuller-k) as
fraction of the OLS bias is greater than 10%” and “the actual size of the TSLS (LIML) t-test as a fraction of OLS bias is greater than 10%”.
The critical values for the ﬁrst-stage F-test at the 5% signiﬁcance level and with three instruments are given by 13.91 (TSLS bias), 9.61
(Fuller-k bias), 22.30 (TSLS size) and 6.46 (LIML size).
+: signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1%.
Kantian Community Redistributive Vertical Fairness Tax Evasion Tax Amnesty
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Tax Morale Score 1.949∗∗ 0.534 1.894∗∗ 0.517 2.143∗∗ 0.645 6.436∗ 2.560 3.781∗∗ 1.280 1.705∗∗ 0.465 3.423∗∗ 1.281
Age -0.085∗∗ 0.017 -0.079∗∗ 0.016 -0.082∗∗ 0.017 -0.092∗∗ 0.025 -0.058∗∗ 0.018 -0.074∗∗ 0.016 -0.100∗∗ 0.025
Age2/100 0.059∗∗ 0.014 0.055∗∗ 0.014 0.056∗∗ 0.014 0.068∗∗ 0.021 0.038∗ 0.016 0.052∗∗ 0.014 0.079∗∗ 0.022
Female 0.165∗ 0.080 0.148+ 0.079 0.102 0.080 -0.010 0.119 0.066 0.095 0.120 0.078 0.155 0.108
Married 0.650∗∗ 0.127 0.624∗∗ 0.127 0.725∗∗ 0.130 0.618∗∗ 0.175 0.719∗∗ 0.151 0.614∗∗ 0.126 0.669∗∗ 0.174
Divorced -0.016 0.151 -0.012 0.151 -0.011 0.153 -0.148 0.207 -0.053 0.177 -0.155 0.149 -0.128 0.201
Widowed -0.274∗ 0.131 -0.290∗ 0.130 -0.171 0.138 -0.358∗ 0.181 -0.252 0.156 -0.299∗ 0.130 -0.363∗ 0.181
Primary School -0.177 0.145 -0.160 0.143 0.050 0.140 -0.165 0.198 -0.102 0.165 -0.143 0.141 -0.062 0.207
J.High School -0.027 0.180 0.032 0.173 0.355∗ 0.162 -0.108 0.269 0.003 0.211 0.155 0.161 0.214 0.232
High School -0.033 0.219 0.123 0.195 0.439∗ 0.173 -0.314 0.389 -0.038 0.265 0.262 0.179 0.318 0.245
College -0.235 0.268 -0.045 0.241 0.283 0.222 -0.408 0.420 -0.262 0.327 0.110 0.225 0.130 0.307
Self-employed 0.104 0.118 0.075 0.114 -0.044 0.108 0.254 0.198 0.180 0.154 0.107 0.117 0.038 0.151
Retired -0.011 0.107 -0.004 0.107 0.037 0.109 0.116 0.155 -0.011 0.126 -0.027 0.106 -0.069 0.143
Unemployed -0.773∗∗ 0.201 -0.748∗∗ 0.200 -0.779∗∗ 0.204 -0.835∗∗ 0.280 -0.522∗ 0.246 -0.766∗∗ 0.200 -0.824∗∗ 0.270
Not working -0.165 0.129 -0.147 0.129 -0.071 0.139 0.065 0.213 -0.020 0.168 -0.148 0.129 -0.131 0.183
Income Earners ≥ 2 -0.006 0.110 -0.086 0.111 0.064 0.115 0.228 0.182 0.005 0.131 -0.044 0.110 -0.029 0.149
Household size= 2 0.086 0.111 0.059 0.110 0.081 0.113 0.056 0.152 0.016 0.131 0.022 0.109 -0.043 0.152
Household size> 2 -0.091 0.133 -0.093 0.132 -0.104 0.135 -0.116 0.183 -0.252 0.169 -0.118 0.132 -0.166 0.180
Kids ≤ 5 0.007 0.131 0.077 0.130 -0.035 0.134 0.179 0.187 0.102 0.155 0.005 0.130 -0.018 0.176
Home owners 0.449∗∗ 0.085 0.420∗∗ 0.083 0.454∗∗ 0.087 0.407∗∗ 0.114 0.423∗∗ 0.099 0.364∗∗ 0.082 0.364∗∗ 0.113
Medium town -0.047 0.067 -0.075 0.065 -0.091 0.066 -0.100 0.089 -0.147+ 0.077 -0.109+ 0.064 0.116 0.126
Big Town -0.004 0.118 0.008 0.119 0.029 0.124 0.061 0.173 -0.025 0.138 -0.068 0.113 0.302 0.206
Continued on next page
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4Table 10: Happiness and Tax Morale (continued)
Kantian Community Redistributive Vertical Fairness Tax Evasion Tax Amnesty
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Area: Center -0.246∗∗ 0.083 -0.156∗ 0.079 -0.163∗ 0.080 -0.380∗∗ 0.142 -0.114 0.094 -0.327∗∗ 0.092 -0.183+ 0.105
Area: South -0.121 0.101 -0.180+ 0.093 -0.182+ 0.095 -0.474∗∗ 0.131 -0.299∗∗ 0.100 -0.355∗∗ 0.084 -0.049 0.166
log(y) 0.268∗∗ 0.070 0.302∗∗ 0.068 0.349∗∗ 0.070 0.100 0.129 0.174+ 0.095 0.258∗∗ 0.070 0.238∗∗ 0.092
log(yR) -0.043 0.136 -0.084 0.134 -0.109 0.136 0.164 0.218 -0.124 0.159 -0.106 0.133 -0.005 0.181
Politics 0.008 0.090 0.099 0.079 0.038 0.089 -0.110 0.157 0.010 0.108 0.061 0.083 -0.015 0.125
Associations -0.010 0.115 0.060 0.104 0.119 0.100 0.124 0.135 0.099 0.119 0.090 0.100 0.062 0.139
Intercept 6.108∗∗ 1.224 6.070∗∗ 1.221 5.755∗∗ 1.243 6.131∗∗ 1.683 7.143∗∗ 1.498 6.693∗∗ 1.229 5.489∗∗ 1.675
n 3796 3796 3796 3796 3796 3796 3275
LM [p-value] 58.22 [0.00] 64.56 [0.00] 59.27 [0.00] 11.19 [0.01] 19.05 [0.00] 74.23 [0.00] 14.44 [0.00]
F 19.96 22.16 20.25 3.724 6.339 25.42 4.81
J [p-value] 0.14 [0.93] 0.09 [0.95] 0.833 [0.70] 0.88 [0.644] 1.48 [0.47] 0.20 [0.90] 1.48 [0.47]
H [p-value] 11.41 [0.00] 12.36 [0.00] 13.13 [0.00] 13.08 [0.00] 12.87 [0.00] 13.92 [0.00] 12.87 [0.00]
CLR (0.969,3.195) (0.942,3.081) (1.020,3.799) (2.906,21.471) (1.775,8.291) (0.846,2.751) (1.658,9.770)
3
5Table 11. Factor loadings. Factor loadings and unique variance from principal factor analysis.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
Kantian 0.736 -0.147 0.494
Community 0.695 -0.147 0.494
Redistributive 0.452 -0.175 0.764
Tax evasion 0.526 0.022 0.722
Tax amnesty 0.294 0.017 0.912
Vertical 0.206 0.442 0.761
Fairness 0.339 0.416 0.711
Figure 5: Factor Analysis: Scree plot (solid line) and 95th percentile of the empirical distribution



























































































































































Table 12. Happiness and Tax Morale Indices - Sensitivity Analysis (Factor analysis)
TM∗
2 aggregates the Kantian, Community, Redistributive and Tax evasion items. We only report the TSLS
and LIML estimates for the coeﬃcient on TM∗
2 and related test statistics. See Table 9 for a description of
the estimation output.
TM∗
2 [s.e.] 0.2412∗∗ [0.064]
n 3796
LM [p-value] 108.34 [0.00]
F 38.40
J [p-value] 0.558 [0.756]
H [p-value] 10.045 [0.001]
CLR [0.120,0.377]
LIML TM∗
2 [s.e.] 0.2421 [0.0645]
36Table 13. Happiness and Tax Morale Indices - Sensitivity Analysis (Material well-being)
The sample consists of household heads born in odd years taken from SHIW 2004. The excluded group is given
by single male blue collar workers, living in a city with less than 40.000 inhabitants located in Northern Italy
with ﬁnancial wealth and real assets holding in the ﬁrst quintile of the corresponding empirical distributions.
Dependent Variable: Stated Happiness.
Tax Morale Indices TM1 and TM2 are deﬁned in Table 7.
All regressions include socio-demographic dumies, town size dummies and regional dummies.
Instruments and Diagnostic Tests: see Table 9.
+: signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1%.
A. Wealth TM1 TM2
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Tax Morale Index 0.199∗∗ 0.049 0.264∗∗ 0.066
Fin.Wealth II quintile 0.220∗ 0.107 0.204∗∗ 0.123
Fin.Wealth III quintile 0.265∗ 0.112 0.294∗∗ 0.125
Fin.Wealth IV quintile 0.256∗ 0.110 0.303∗∗ 0.124
Fin.Wealth V quintile 0.385∗∗ 0.123 0.427∗∗ 0.133
Real Assets II quintile 0.226∗ 0.114 0.269+ 0.122
Real Assets III quintile 0.199 0.125 0.263+ 0.136
Real Assets IV quintile 0.446∗∗ 0.130 0.478∗∗ 0.140
Real Assets V quintile 0.407∗ 0.135 0.449∗ 0.144
n 3277 3277
LM (underidentiﬁcation) [p-value] 86.69 [0.00] 80.02 [0.88]
F (ﬁrst stage) 30.80 28.249
J (overidentiﬁcation) [p-value] 0.354 [0.83] 0.01 [0.99]
H (endogeneity) [p-value] 10.534 [0.00] 12.59 [0.00]
CLR conﬁdence interval (0.106,0.306) (0.141,0.409)
B. Living conditions TM1 TM2
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Tax Morale index 0.193∗∗ 0.051 0.264∗∗ 0.0673
With diﬃculty 0.602∗∗ 0.130 0.728∗∗ 0.130
Not easily 0.974∗∗ 0.113 1.135∗∗ 0.115
Fairly easily 1.329∗∗ 0.121 1.461∗∗ 0.121
Easily/Very easily 1.388∗∗ 0.154 1.507∗∗ 0.154
LM [p-value] 82.01 [0.00] 77.31 [0.00]
F 28.922 27.16
J [p-value] 1.296 [0.52] 0.665 [0.717]
H [p-value] 10.343 [0.00] 12.11 [0.00]
CLR (0.099,0.306) (0.133,0.405)
37Table 14. Happiness and Tax Morale Items - Sensitivity Analysis (Material well-being)
The sample consists of household heads born in odd years taken from SHIW 2004. The excluded group is given by single male blue collar
workers, living in a city with less than 40.000 inhabitants located in Northern Italy with ﬁnancial wealth and real assets holding in the ﬁrst
quintile of the corresponding empirical distributions.
Dependent Variable: Stated Happiness.
Kantian: 1, if “Very much” in the Kantian question, 0 otherwise;
Community: 1, if “Very much” in the Community question, 0 otherwise;
Redistributive: 1, if “Not at all” in the Redistributive question, 0 otherwise;
All regressions include socio-demographic dummies, town size dummies and regional dummies.
Instruments and Tests: see Table 9.
+: signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗: signiﬁcant at 1%.
A. Wealth Kantian Community Redistributive Vertical Fairness Tax Evasion Tax Amnesty
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Morale Item 1.993∗∗ 0.540 1.951∗∗ 0.524 2.141∗∗ 0.647 6.734∗ 2.691 3.868∗∗ 1.291 1.743∗∗ 0.470 3.560∗∗ 1.331
Fin.Wealth II quintile 0.198∗ 0.099 0.166+ 0.100 0.310∗∗ 0.103 0.220 0.139 0.249∗ 0.118 0.213∗ 0.098 0.068 0.167
Fin.Wealth III quintile 0.301∗∗ 0.102 0.313∗∗ 0.101 0.423∗∗ 0.105 0.180 0.156 0.265∗ 0.123 0.325∗∗ 0.100 0.233 0.157
Fin.Wealth IV quintile 0.367∗∗ 0.106 0.301∗∗ 0.105 0.363∗∗ 0.107 0.161 0.162 0.134 0.140 0.292∗∗ 0.105 0.185 0.164
Fin.Wealth V quintile 0.411∗∗ 0.114 0.464∗∗ 0.113 0.513∗∗ 0.116 0.171 0.196 0.218 0.156 0.433∗∗ 0.113 0.354∗ 0.168
Real Assets II quintile 0.321∗∗ 0.109 0.343∗∗ 0.110 0.295∗∗ 0.110 0.216 0.153 0.319∗ 0.130 0.272∗ 0.107 0.361∗ 0.164
Real Assets III quintile 0.359∗∗ 0.124 0.390∗∗ 0.126 0.372∗∗ 0.127 0.029 0.190 0.301∗ 0.144 0.210+ 0.120 0.296+ 0.179
Real Assets IV quintile 0.502∗∗ 0.126 0.580∗∗ 0.129 0.562∗∗ 0.131 0.465∗∗ 0.176 0.630∗∗ 0.161 0.404∗∗ 0.124 0.709∗∗ 0.218
Real Assets V quintile 0.521∗∗ 0.134 0.506∗∗ 0.133 0.552∗∗ 0.137 0.322+ 0.193 0.497∗∗ 0.158 0.358∗∗ 0.133 0.586∗∗ 0.203
n 3798 3798 3798 3798 3798 3277 3277
LM [p-value] 60.56 [0.00] 64.84 [0.00] 62.61 [0.00] 12.16 [0.00] 20.02 [0.00] 76.09 [0.00] 15.34 [0.00]
F 19.530 21.520 19.982 3.561 6.317 24.931 4.614
J [p-value] 0.227 [0.89] 0.042 [0.97] 2.67 [0.26] 0.74 [0.69] 0.78 [0.67] 0.27 [0.87] 1.16 [0.55]
H [p-value] 11.709 [0.00] 12.764 [0.00] 12.052 [0.00] 13.718 [0.00] 13.636 [0.00] 14.325 [0.00] 13.331 [0.00]
CLR (1.007,3.264) (0.987,3.158) (1.032,3.844) (3.066,23.215) (1.846,8.396) (0.877,2.806) (1.692,9.987)
Continued on next page
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8Table 14: Happiness and Tax Morale Items - Robustness (continued)
A. Living conditions Kantian Community Redistributive Vertical Fairness Tax Evasion Tax Amnesty
Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE Coeﬀ. SE
Morale Item 2.022∗∗ 0.547 1.991∗∗ 0.511 2.237∗∗ 0.693 7.579∗ 3.307 4.118∗∗ 1.331 1.806∗∗ 0.468 3.875∗∗ 1.435
With diﬃculty 0.850∗∗ 0.149 0.789∗∗ 0.143 0.888∗∗ 0.158 0.708∗∗ 0.196 0.559∗∗ 0.169 0.857∗∗ 0.146 0.733∗∗ 0.201
Not easily 1.103∗∗ 0.127 1.172∗∗ 0.131 1.241∗∗ 0.146 1.015∗∗ 0.174 0.880∗∗ 0.150 1.201∗∗ 0.132 1.194∗∗ 0.184
Fairly easily 1.452∗∗ 0.132 1.573∗∗ 0.138 1.613∗∗ 0.148 1.453∗∗ 0.190 1.321∗∗ 0.159 1.555∗∗ 0.136 1.599∗∗ 0.197
Easily/Very easily 1.494∗∗ 0.167 1.690∗∗ 0.177 1.617∗∗ 0.174 1.356∗∗ 0.251 1.199∗∗ 0.220 1.589∗∗ 0.169 1.715∗∗ 0.246
n 3798 3798 3798 3798 3798 3277 3277
LM [p-value] 57.39 [0.00] 64.39 [0.00] 59.93 [0.00] 10.73 [0.01] 19.23 [0.00] 73.24 [0.00] 22.88 [0.00]
F 19.656 22.120 20.506 3.571 6.397 25.088 4.741
J [p-value] 1.119 [0.572] 0.220 [0.896] 4.277 [0.118] 1.409 [0.494] 0.228 [0.892] 0.174 [0.917] 0.768 [0.681]
H [p-value] 12.335 [0.00] 13.654 [0.00] 11.531 [0.00] 13.539 [0.00] 16.372 [0.00] 15.416 [0.00] 15.031 [0.00]
CLR (1.040,3.279) (1.048,3.173) (1.032,3.819) (3.274,26.305) (2.003,8.354) (0.950,2.848) (1.749,9.442)
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